Cursor Marketplace Distributed Malicious Claude Code Extension With SSH Backdoor
Modified versions of the anthropic.claude-code extension for macOS and Windows were available in the Cursor Marketplace for approximately 11 hours. Simply updating the extension may not remove persistence traces.

Cursor Marketplace compromise led to the brief distribution of malicious versions of the anthropic.claude-code extension for the Cursor development environment on October 29, 2026. Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for macOS and Windows were affected. According to Cursor, they were available approximately from 02:27 to 13:35 PDT.
The embedded malicious code attempted to create persistent remote access through SSH. Microsoft stated in its technical analysis that it attempted to add the attacker’s public SSH key, activate a local SSH service, create a reverse SSH tunnel, and maintain persistence through operating-system mechanisms.
Cursor Marketplace compromise affected two releases
Cursor confirmed the removal of the malicious versions from its VS Code Extension Marketplace. The Marketplace was also temporarily disabled, its keys were rotated, and the service was subsequently restored. The company also says that the server used by the attacker was taken offline.
The incident did not affect all Claude Code distribution channels. Microsoft stated that the Microsoft Visual Studio Marketplace and the @anthropic-ai/claude-code npm package were not affected. According to Microsoft, Anthropic also did not confirm a compromise of its own systems.
The extension’s name referred to Anthropic’s Claude Code, but confirmed information concerns the distribution of modified packages through the Cursor Marketplace. It has not yet been publicly confirmed how the packages entered the Marketplace or who was behind the attack.
Why simply removing the extension is not enough
The risk is not limited to the extension package itself. The malicious loader could have created artifacts outside its directory, including an unauthorized SSH key and items intended to run when the system started. Removing the extension or switching to a newer version therefore may not, by itself, remove all traces of compromise.
Microsoft specifically warned about indicators associated with the key labeled svc-telemetry, the .smt and .smtk files, and SysMon startup items on Windows or com.apple.sysmond on macOS. These indicators are intended to help organizations and administrators check systems on which the affected versions were installed or run.
The malicious code also collected a list of names of potentially sensitive environment variables, not their values. The published analysis therefore cannot be taken as confirmation that the attacker obtained secrets, tokens, or other credentials. It is likewise unknown how many devices actually ran the loader and where functional remote access was successfully created.
Tunnel success was not confirmed on every device
Individual malware steps may not have succeeded in every environment. Creating a reverse SSH tunnel depended on user permissions, SSH configuration, and the availability of the attacker’s infrastructure. However, according to the available findings, even an unsuccessful tunnel does not rule out the writing of an SSH key or the creation of startup artifacts.
This was a supply-chain incident involving a developer tool. Developer workstations may contain source code, access tokens, and cloud credentials, so checking for persistence—not just updating the package—is relevant for affected installations.
More information may emerge after the cause of the Marketplace compromise, the number of potentially affected users, or confirmed cases of subsequent attacker activity is disclosed. Organizations may also track the results of checks for the listed indicators of compromise and any measures requiring extensions to be installed only from approved publishers.
Sources
- Microsoft Security Blog – Independent technical analysis of the embedded JavaScript, attempts at SSH persistence, the scope of unaffected distribution channels, and detection and remediation recommendations.
- Cursor Security Notice – Confirms the distribution window, affected versions, the takedown of the malicious infrastructure, Cursor’s actions, and indicators of compromise.
Verified and updated: 11/01/2026 06:19



